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DEFINING ECONOMIC AGGRESSION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE POSSIBILITY OF
REGIONAL ACTION BY THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES
The U.N. General Assembly's adoption of Resolution 33141 in Decem-
ber 1974 was the culmination of several decades of international efforts to
define aggression. 2 Many countries view this accomplishment as a major
step in the codification of international law, while others are dissatisfied
with the limited scope of the definition.3 One of the objections to the
General Assembly's definition is its failure to deal with ideological, polit-
ical, economic, and other forms of indirect aggression. Throughout the
United Nations debates many Latin American countries called for an
extension of the definition to include indirect coercion, especially
economic aggression. 4 The failure to include economic aggression in the
U.N. definition and the position of several Latin American countries
during the deliberations raise the question whether it is legally possible,
politically feasible, and desirable from the standpoint of world order to
define economic aggression within the Organization of American States.
This Note will focus on defining economic aggression within the
O.A.S. The elements of the definition, the appropriate international body
to enforce it, and the implications of such a codification on other tradi-
tional norms of international law will be explored.
1. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
2. See generally Report of the Secretary-General, 7 U.N. GAOR, II Annexes (Agenda
Item 54) 17, U.N. Doc. A/2211 (1952); E. ARONEANU, LA DEFINITION DE L'AGRESSION
(1958); B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION, THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE(1975); B. SUPERVIELLE, LAS NUEVAS FORMAS DE AGRESION (1961); A.V.W. THOMAS & A.J.
THOMAS, THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972); Braun, La definicidn
de "agresidn" en el seno de la Organizaci6n de las Naciones Unidas, 1950-1968, 10 FORO
INTERNACIONAL 436 (1970). -
3. See Summary Report of the Sixth Committee, 29 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1490th Mtg.) 155,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1490 (1974).
4. For a more complete description of the Latin American countries' position at the
U.N., see notes 12-17 infra and accompanying text. This position is not held by Latin
American countries alone. For example, in a letter addressed to the U.N. Secretary-
General, the permanent representative of Afghanistan to the U.N. requested the inclusion in
the agenda of the 30th Session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "Need to extend
the definition of aggression in the light of the present international situation." 30 U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/10193, at 1 (1975). The explanatory memorandum stated that "the
definition of aggression should be expanded to include all methods of force and coercion,
direct or indirect, including economic and political pressures." Id., Annex at 2.
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I
LATIN AMERICA AND THE LIMITED
U.N. DEFINITION
The road to defining aggression in international law was a long and
arduous one. Throughout this process, numerous proposals were made to
add economic and other indirect forms of coercion to the definition of
armed aggression.- Draft resolutions were submitted to conferences and
committees of the League of Nations6 and the United Nations,7 as well as
to regional and sub-regional conferences. 8 Within the U.N., it soon be-
came clear that these proposals would not gain general acceptance. 9 The
Chairman of the last U.N. Special Committee reported that most of its
members felt that the definition of aggression "should concentrate on
armed aggression."'" But the issue -remained; the Chairman was com-
pelled to note that "some dissatisfaction had been expressed because the
draft definition did not cover economic aggression."'" The delegates of
the Latin American states expressed much of this dissatisfaction. 2
5. See E. ARONEANU, supra noti 2, at 75-84; B. SUPERVIELLE, supra note 2, at 62-67.
6. For example, the Soviet Union in 1931 proposed a protocol of Economic Non-
Aggression to the Commission of Enquiry for European Union. The Protocol sought to
eliminate discriminatory practices in economic relations among the signatory countries.
Draft Protocol of Economic Non-Aggression Proposed by the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, 1931 League of Nations Publications VII. Political, ser. 7, Annex
7 (Commission of Enquiry for European Union), at 89, League of Nations Doc. C. 395. M.
158. 1931. VII. (1931). See also B. SUPERVIELLE, supra note 2, at 62-63; Zourek, La
difinition de l'agression et le droit international, diveloppements ricents de la question, 92
RECUEIL DES COURS 755, 831-32 (1957).
7. In 1952 Bolivia submitted a draft resolution to the U.N. General Assembly Sixth
Committee which was, for the first time, considering the definition of aggression. The draft
defined as aggression any "unilateral action to deprive a state of the economic resources
derived from the fair practice of international trade, or to endanger its basic economy, thus
jeopardising [sic] the security of that State." Report of the International Law Commission
Covering the Work of its Third Session, Question of Defining Aggression 83, 6 U.N. GAOR,
C.6, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/ L.211 (1952); cf. 7 U.N. GAOR, Special Committee on the Question
of Defining Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/AC.66/L.2/Rev.l (1953) (U.S.S.R. draft resolution).
8. At the eighth international American Conference, held in Lima in 1938, Colombia
proposed a Treaty on Inter-American Trade and Economic Aggression. Article V of that
treaty condemned the use of coercive economic measures intended to influence relations
among signatory nations. Speech by Mr. Dihigo, Cuban delegate, Ninth International
Conference of American States, Comisi6n de Iniciativas (April 23, 1948), reprinted in 2
NOVENA CONFERENCIA INTERNACIONAL AMERICANA, AcrAS Y DOCUMENTOS 346, 348-49
(1953). A translation of the preamble to the draft treaty can be found in A.J. THOMAS,
A.V.W. THOMAS, & 0. SALAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION AND
SUBVERSION 71 (Annex 1966) [hereinafter cited as THOMAS].
9. See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 2, at 74, para. 446; Report of the
Sixth Committee, 7 U.N.. GAOR, II Annexes (Agenda Item 54) 86, 88, para. 32, U.N. Doc.
A/2322 (1952).
10. Summary Report of the Sixth Committee, 29 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1471st mtg.) 41,42,
para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1471 (1974).
It. Id.
12. When the draft definition which was eventually adopted by the General Assembly
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This dissenting position may be better understood in light of the Latin
American countries' long-standing concern with nonintervention and
their broad conception of aggression. Although the principle of noninter-
vention first appeared as part of an official instrument of the inter-
American system at the Montevideo Conference in 1933,13 the origin of
this principle in the Americas may be traced back to the declaration of the
Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Since then many international jurists and diplo-
mats have contributed to and altered the concept of nonintervention-
surely one of the cornerstones of the inter-American system. 14 In 1948
nonintervention became linked with economic aggression in the writings
of Cuban scholars.' 5 This Cuban position was expressed at the Ninth
was discussed in 1974 by the Sixth Committee, 19 of the 26 Latin American delegations
presented their views. Eleven delegations did not perceive a need to expand the definition of
aggression in economic terms (they were Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nicaragua,
Panama, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Venezuela, Guatemala and Honduras). The remaining eight
delegations (Chile, Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, El Salvador, Cuba and the Domini-
can Republic) were all in agreement that the definition as proposed was incomplete, lacking
one of the most common and dangerous forms of aggression-economic aggression. See
Summary Report of the Sixth Committee, 29 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1474th mtg.-1489th mtg.) 53,
U.N. Docs. A/C.6/SR. 1471 to 1489 (1974). For example, the Peruvian delegate stated that
the Special Committee "had ignored the form of aggression which was most common at the
present time, namely, economic aggression." Id. (1474th mtg.) at 54, para. 7, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/SR.1474.
The views of some Latin American delegations at the Twenty-ninth Session were not
entirely consistent with those expressed by the same delegations at earlier sessions. For
example, the representative of Guatemala at the Twenty-ninth Session referred to "the use
of armed force" as "the corner-stone of the definition." Id. (1479th mtg.) at 82, para. 18,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1479. However, at the Twelfth Session in 1957 the Guatemalan
delegate had stated that "in modern times it was indisputable that economic or ideological
aggression was capable of constituting. . . a threat [to the peace]." 12 U.N. GAOR, C.6
(520th mtg.) 49, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.520 (1957). Moreover, a few Latin American
delegations that did not speak on the question of defining aggression at the Twenty-ninth
Session had commented on the importance of economic aggression at earlier sessions. Of all
the Latin American countries, Mexico most consistently supported a definition limited to
armed aggression, while El Salvador and Bolivia were among the most vocal delegations
calling for a definition which included -economic aggression. The overall pattern which
emerges is that the Latin American countries provided much of the impetus within the U.N.
for addressing the issue of economic aggression. For alist of the summary records of all the
meetings of the Special Committees on the Question of Defining Aggression since 1953, see
I B. FERENCZ, supra note 2, at xvii-xx.
13. Article 8 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States reads: "No State has the
right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." Quoted in INTER-AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, at xxvi (1966)
[hereinafter cited as INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM].
14. Some of the well-known figures from Latin America who have lent their names to the
noninterventionist doctrine are Carlos Calvo, Luis Maria Drago, and Jos6 Maria Yepes. See
I. FABELA, INTERVENc06N 100, 108-12, 114-15 (1961); INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA 142
(C. Ronning ed. 1970); A.V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION 56-57 (1956).
15. "Intervention is intimately related to the problem of economic aggression, since the
former may consist of economic activities which pressure or coerce a nation into accepting
given demands." R. GONZ.LES Mufioz, DOCTRINA GRAu 76 (1948) (translation by the
author).
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International American Conference held in Bogoti in 1948,16 and became
the basis for Article 16 of the O.A.S. Charter, which condemned the use
of "coercive measures of an economic or political character."' 17 The
vague principle of international law contained in that provision was
adopted almost verbatim by the General Assembly seventeen years la-
ter. 18 Although the notion that a state may not use economic force to
coerce another state has recently gained wide recognition, the concept of
economic aggression remains vague and undefined.19 The inter-American
system thus presents an ideal testing ground for defining economic ag-
gression in international law.
II
IS THERE A NEED TO DEFINE ECONOMIC AGGRESSION?
In recent years allegations of economic aggression have not been un-
common. When the United States reduced Cuba's sugar import quota in
1960, the Cuban government charged that this measure constituted an act
of aggression. 20 More recently, Iceland has complained of "fishing ag-
gression" by Great Britain;2' Chile has accused the United States of
economic aggression leading to the'downfall of the Allende government; 22
16. See the text of the speech by Mr. Dihigo, supra note 8, at 346-51.
17. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 19, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2631, 119
U.N.T.S. 3, amended by Protocol of Amendment, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S.
No. 6847, 721 U.N.T.S. 324 [hereinafter cited as the O.A.S. Charter]. The original Article
16, which is now Article 19, is set forth in the text accompanying note 48 infra. For a brief
history of the Cuban position, see THOMAS, supra note 8, at 73-74, 76.
18. See G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 11, 12, para. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/6014 (1965). Paragraph 2 is set forth in the text accompanying note 32 infra.
19. See notes 38-39 infra and accompanying text.
20. Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cuba to the President of the Security
Council, 15 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (July-Sept. 1960) 9, U.N. Doc. S/4378 (1960). The incident is
discussed in M. ETzIONI, THE MAJORITY OF ONE 147-53 (1970). For Security Council
discussions see 15 U.N. SCOR (874th mtg.-876th mtg.), U.N. Does. S/PV.874 to 876 (1960).
21. Iceland's claim is based on the danger to its economy caused by the depletion of
fishing stocks. Iceland has asserted this danger in an effort to escape the provisions of a
1961 agreement with Great Britain which gives British vessels the right to fish at designated
times and places within Iceland's 12 mile fishing zone. When Iceland attempted to extend its
fishing zone to 50 nautical miles, it raised the issue of whether alleged acts of economic
aggression trigger the right to self-defense. Katz, Issues Arising in the Icelandic Fisheries
Case, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 83, 83-84, 98-104 (1973). On February 19, 1976, Iceland broke
off diplomatic relations with Great Britain because of this dispute. This break followed
Iceland's attempt to keep British trawlers out of its newly declared 200 mile fishing limit.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1976, at 3, col. 7.
22. Brosche, The Arab Oil Embargo and United States Pressure Against Chile: Economic
and Political Coercion and the Charter of the United Nations, 7 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3,
11-16 (1974). But see Sigmund, The "Invisible Blockade" and the Overthrow of A lende, 52
FOREIGN AFF. 322 (1974). See also Lowenthal, Correspondence, id. at 644 (letter to the
Editor); Sigmund, id. at 645 (reply to Lowenthal).
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and some nations have charged the Arab states with exerting illegal
economic pressure by imposing an oil embargo in 1973.13 Despite the
frequency of such claims, the legal grounds for a claim of economic
aggression remain unclear. Much of the debate has centered on the
question of whether the prohibition against "the threat or use of force" in
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter extends to acts not involving the use of
armed force. Some commentators have construed this provision broad-
ly,24 while others, reading the words strictly, have stated that Article 2(4)
does not encompass economic coercion. 25 This split of opinion suggests
that the U.N. Charter is not a satisfactory legal basis for the claim of
economic aggression.
In certain cases bilateral or multilateral treaties may provide grounds
for allegations of economic aggression. 26 However, the usefulness of
such treaties in policing against economic misconduct is limited. Bilateral
treaties, though numerous, are not universal, and not all states are sig-
natories to multilateral treaties. 27 In addition, under a bilateral treaty the
only effective remedy available to an aggrieved state may be unilateral
action in the form of self-defense or reprisal. 8 Multilateral treaties, such
23. Others have countered that the oil production cutback was permissible under existing
international law. Compare Brosche, supra note 22, at 34; and Paust & Blaustein, The Arab
Oil Weapon-A Threat to InternationalPeace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1974); with Boorman,
Economic Coercion in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and the Ensuing Juridical
Issues, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 205 (1974); and Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its
Legality Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (1974). See generally Comment,
The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality UnderArticle 2(4) of the Charter of the
United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 983 (1974).
24. Professor Brosche, for example, has argued that current trends in international law
point toward a more liberal reading of Article 2(4); he concludes that both the oil embargo by
the Arab states and the economic and political pressures exerted by the United States
against Chile before the overthrow of Allende were violative of Article 2(4). Brosche, supra
note 22, at 34. He concedes, however, that the rejection of a Brazilian proposal at the San
Francisco Conference to amend Article 2(4) to expressly cover economic force suggests that
the delegates opposed a broad construction of the word "force." Id. at 22.
25. Professor.Brownlie has stated that while the term "force" may have a wider meaning
than armed force, "it is very doubtful if it applies to economic measures of a coercive
nature." I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 362 (1963)
(footnote omitted).
26. Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 245, 247-48
(1976); Muir, The Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 187, 200-02 (1974).
27. Only 14 members of the O.A.S., including the United States, have subscribed to the
G~neral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Al1,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 266 [hereinafter cited as the GATT]. Bolivia, Ecuador,
Venezuela and Mexico are among those O.A.S. members who have not subscribed. Colom-
bia has provisionally subscribed. The agreement is being applied de facto to one American
state, Grenada. Treaty Affairs Staff, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State,
[1977] TREATIES IN FORCE 298.
28. Self-defense and reprisal actions are subject to limitations imposed by Chapter VI of
the U.N. Charter (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), by any applicable treaty provisions for
the settlement of disputes, and by traditional requirements of necessity and proportionality.
See Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L 1,7, 10-11 (1972).
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as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,29 often establish specific
procedures for the settlement of disputes. However, the exhaustion of
such enforcement measures is usually a precondition to any other reme-
dy. 30
In addition to treaties and the U.N. Charter, several recent General
Assembly resolutions have dealt with the question of undue economic
pressure. The nonintervention resolution 3' adopted in 1965 provided:
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any
other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it
the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it
advantages of any kind. 32
In a 1973 resolution the General Assembly deplored "acts of States which
use force, armed aggression, economic coercion or any other illegal or
improper means in resolving disputes concerning the exercise of . . .
sovereign rights." 33 Among the General Assembly's most recent declara-
tions touching on this question is the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, 34 which condemns the use of economic or other meas-
ures of coercion. 35 While these declarations may evidence a current trend
against the use of economic pressure,36 their practical effect is limited.
General Assembly resolutions are not binding. Furthermore, lack of
support from a substantial number of members, and the requirement of
practice through time before a rule of customary international law is
established, limit the legal effect of General Assembly resolutions. 37
Finally, the condemnations contained in these resolutions, as well as
29. GATT, supra note 27.
30. The GATT provides for the referral of disputes to meetings of the representatives of
the contracting parties acting jointly, and limits enforcement measures under the GATT to
the suspension of its application in appropriate cases. Id. art. XXIII, para. 2; id. art. XXV,
para. 1.
31. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 14) 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
32. Id. at 12, para. 2. This paragraph was reproduced almost verbatim in the Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, 123, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
33. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, G.A. Res. 3171, para. 4, 28 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 52, 53, U.N. Doc.A/9030 (1973).
34. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
35. But see Tiewul, The United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 645, 675 (1975) (pointing out that the Charter disposes of the
phenomenon of economic coercion rather sparingly).
36. On the weight of General Assembly resolutions, see Boorman, supra note 23, at 213;
Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782
(1966).
37. Zaphiriou, The U.N. Economic Charter and U.S. Investment and Policy, 27 MERCER
L. REV. 749, 750-51 (1976).
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those in other international documents,38 are too general to have any
practical significance. 39 Specific criteria must be developed to guide inter-
national deliberative bodies presented with allegations of economic ag-
gression.
III
THE INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY SYSTEM
Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter permits the establishment of regional
arrangements which may deal with matters of "international peace and
security . . . appropriate for regional action." 4 The inclusion of this
provision was a concession by the draftsmen at the San Francisco Con-
ference to the American states, which had already been loosely organized
for over a century and formally united since 1890,41 and which forcefully
pressed for the existence of regional groupings within the universalist
framework of the United Nations. 42 The present inter-American system
of security was shaped soon after the formation of the U.N. with the
conclusion of two treaties: the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal As-
sistance (Rio Treaty) in 1947, 43 and the Charter of the O.A.S. in 1948. 44
The Charter of the O.A.S. states that it is a regional agency of the
United Nations.45 Its concept of what constitutes illegal use of force,
however, is much more expansive than that embodied in Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter. 46 In language that closely foreshadowed future General
Assembly resolutions, 47 Article 19 of the O.A.S. Charter provides:
No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of
another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.48
38. For example, at the insistence of certain Latin American states, the Final Act of the
U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/26 (1969), reprinted in
U.N. Doc. AICONF.39/1 l/Add.2, at 281 (1969), included a provision condemning the use or
threat of pressure in any form, including economic, in order to coerce another state into
signing (or not signing) a treaty. Id. at 285; Muir, supra note 26, at 199.
39. As one author has commented, "such guidelines as the U.N. has provided are so
general that they are not likely to be useful to authoritative decision makers who control
municipal and international bases of power." Boorman, supra note 23, at 230; accord,
Bowett, supra note 26, at 248.
40. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1.
41. INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 13, at xx-xxxvi.
42. A. G6MEZ ROBLEDO, LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Y EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO 8 (1974).
43. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, opened for signature Sept. 2, 1947,
62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter cited as the Rio Treaty].
44. O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 17.
45. Id. art. 1.
46. Sde notes 24 & 25 supra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text.
48. O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 17, art. 19.
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Chapter V, dealing with collective, security, refers to the threat to the
sovereignty or political independence of an American state caused "by an
armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack."4 9
The O.A.S. Charter does not specifically provide an enforcement
mechanism; rather, it incorporates by reference the procedures estab-
lished by the Rio Treaty and other special agreements on inter-American
security. 50 Unfortunately, reference to the text of the Rio Treaty does not
clarify the meaning of "an act of aggression that is not an armed attack."
Article 6 of the Treaty provides:
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or
political independence of any American State should be affected by an
aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or
intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might
endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet
immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case
of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression . . .
Based on a literal interpretation of this provision, it is possible for the
Organ of Consultation52 to find a purely economic act to be an act of
aggression. Therefore, it may, under Article 8 of the Rio Treaty,5 3 au-
thorize nonmilitary measures to assist the victim of the economic aggres-
sion or to maintain continental peace and security.
This construction of Article 6, however, would be inconsistent with the
original purpose of the Rio Treaty and its subsequent applications. The
flexible language of Article 6 was principally intended to protect the
Western Hemisphere from the spread of Communism. The phrase "ag-
gression that is not an armed attack" probably referred to activities such
as aid to mercenaries or guerrillas operating in the territory of a third
state. 54 The intent of the draftsmen is reflected in the history of the
49. Id. art. 28 (emphasis added).
50. Although the O.A.S. Charter does not mention the Rio Treaty by name, the incorpo-
ration of "special treaties on the subject" is an obvious reference to the Rio Treaty,
concluded the year prior to the adoption of the Charter. O.A.S. CHARTER, supra note 17,
art. 28.
51. Rio Treaty, supra note 43, art. 6.
52. The Organ of Consultation is composed of the ministers of foreign affairs of the
American states. Id. art. 11.
53. For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consulta-
tion may agree will comprise one or more of the following: recall of chiefs of
diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular rela-
tions; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communi-
cations; and use of armed force.
Id. art. 8.
54. "[S]ubversive action directed, aided or abetted by extracontinental powers (and
today also by American countries dominated by them) constitutes a special category of act,
fact or situation of the type foreseen in the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty, particularly
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applications of the Rio Treaty, which is pervaded by the theme of anti-
Communism.5
Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that the peacekeeping apparatus
originally established in the late 1940's to fight Communism might provide
the basis for an expansion of the concept of aggression. Most Latin
American countries have normalized their economic relations with Cuba;
even the United States has now begun to move in that direction. 56
Moreover, the policy of detente pursued by the United States suggests
that the anti-Communist aspect of the Rio Treaty may be in the process of
being outgrown, at least with respect to collective action. Finally, the
long-standing concern of the Latin American countries over economic
coercion in international relations, 57 and the desire of several Latin
American states to extend the U.N. definition of agression, 58 further
suggest the possibility of applying the security mechanism of the Rio
Treaty to economic aggression.5 9
'aggression which is not an armed attack.' " INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 13, at
115. Schwebel was puzzled by the seeming contradiction between the Rio Treaty's recogni-
tion of "aggression which is not an armed attack" and the support by certain Latin
American countries of definitions of aggression equating the latter concept with armed
attack. He suggested that this contradiction disappears if the Rio Treaty formulation were
read as meaning the use of force by indirect means, such as the use of mercenaries.
Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defense in Modern International Law, 136
RECUEIL DES CouRs 411, 460-61 (1972). In this context Article 3(g) of the U.N. definition of
aggression characterizes as an act of aggression "[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to the [armed] acts listed above . G.A.
Res. 3314, 29 GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, 143, U.N. Doc. A19631 (1974).
55. While Article 6 has never been applied against an economic aggressor, it has been
held to justify the exclusion of the Cuban government from the inter-American system in
1962, 2 INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE APPLICATIONS 1960-1964, at
65, 72, 75-76 (1972) (Request of the Government of Colombia, 1961-1962) [hereinafter cited
as Rio Treaty Applications], the use of force to block Soviet weapons from reaching Cuba
during the Missile Crisis, id. at 107, 111-12 (Request of the Government of the United
States of America, 1962), and the later imposition of a total embargo on trade with Cuba, id.
at 179, 185-86 (Request of the Government of Venezuela, 1963-1964).
56. E.g., N.Y. Times, June 3, 1977, at Al, col. 2 (limited exchange of diplomats); see,
e.g., id., June 23, 1977, at D3, col. 4 (business reaction).
57. See notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text.
58. See note 12 supra.
59. When the Inter-American Juridical Committee recommended a list of violations of the
principle of nonintervention and discussed possible ways of enforcing the principle, it
considered but rejected the possibility of relying on the existing enforcement mechanism of
the Rio Treaty. The Committee thought that expansion of the Treaty might have the
dangerous effect of jeopardizing the prestige of the O.A.S. which is necessary to carry out
the Organization's more important task-that of preventing armed attack or aggression.
INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INSTRUMENT
RELATING TO VIOLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NONINTERVENTION 13-14 (1959). Similar
objections might be made with regard to expanding the Treaty explicitly to cover acts of
economic aggression.
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Assuming the Latin American states were to interpret the Rio Treaty as
encompassing acts of economic aggression, there remains the problem of
how far a regional group can go in enforcing its peacekeeping treaties
without the approval of the U.N. Security Council. Although the U.N.
Charter contemplates the existence of regional groups and authorizes
"regional action" for the maintenance of international peace and securi-
ty, 60 regional action is limited by Article 53, which provides that "no
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies without the authorization of .the Security Council
.... "61 The controversy over the scope of Article 53's prohibition
centers on the words "enforcement action." Applying a broad construc-
tion to these words, any regional action in connection with peacekeeping
efforts requires prior authorization by the Security Council. In practical
terms, the imposition of any measures under Article 8 of the Rio Treaty,62
even nonmilitary sanctions, would require not only a vote of two-thirds of
the states that have ratified the Treaty,63 but also the approval of nine
members of the Security Council, including the acquiescence of all five
permanent members. 64 Thus, regional action could be paralyzed by the
negative vote of one of the permanent members of the Security Council.
Under a narrow interpretation of Article 53, Security Council approval
would be required only when the measures contemplated by the regional
agency included the use of armed force. 65
The prevalent view among international jurists is that the delegates at
San Francisco intended to retain within the U.N. the exclusive power to
authorize any enforcement measures, whether or not they involve the use
of force.6 Cogent arguments have been made that the text of the U.N.
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 52; see notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
61. U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 1.
62. For the text of Article 8 of the Rio Treaty, see note 53 supra.
63. Rio Treaty, supra note 43, art. 17. Under Article 18 of the Rio Treaty, nations directly
involved in the dispute cannot vote.
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3.
65. The U.N. Charter distinguishes between enforcement measures that entail the use of
armed force and those that do not. Compare id. art. 42 with id. art. 41. In either case, the
Security Council must be fully informed of any action taken. Id. art. 54.
66. See, e.g., M. ETzIoNI, supra note 20, at 70-74; H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 786-87 (1950); A. G6MEZ ROBLEDO, supra note 42, at 61-62. The International
Court of Justice has declared that enforcement action, within the meaning of Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and
Acts of Aggression), "is solely within the province of the Security Council." Advisory
Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151, 165. Quaere whether
this finding resolves the ambiguity in the words "enforcement action" in Chapter VIII
(Regional Arrangements). Muir, supra note 26, at 201-02, notes that the GATT, supra note
27, art. XXI, which was concluded in 1947, allows an exception to its antidiscriminatory
provisions for a state's participation in sanctions authorized by the U.N., but not for
participation in sanctions authorized by the O.A.S. or other regional agencies. This may be
further indirect evidence of a general intention at that time to give the U.N. the exclusive
power to authorize any enforcement action.
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Charter reflects this view. 67 There is considerable opinion to the con-
trary,6 however, and experience has shown that the universalist ap-
proach to this question has little basis in fact. The Security Council has
expressly approved of independent O.A.S. action in at least two in-
stances;69 it has in other cases tolerated O.A.S. enforcement action rang-
ing from nonmilitary sanctions to the use of force.7' Thus the O.A.S. has
effectively usurped at least some of the Security Council's exclusive
authority under Article 53 of the U.N. Charter. According to this
"amended" reading of Article 53,71 prior Security Council authorization
is required only when the enforcement actions by regional organizations
entail the use of armed force.72 Therefore, at least pragmatically, if not
technically, the O.A.S. may impose nonmilitary sanctions without prior
Security Council authorization. 73
67. See A. G6MEZ ROBLEDO, supra note 42, at 78-84.
68. The most compelling statement in this respect remains that of Dr. Lleras Camargo,
then Director General of the Pan American Union and chairman of the committee which
dealt with regional arrangements at the San Francisco Conference:
There is a clear distinction for the reader of the Charter between the measures of
Article 41 (enforcement action) which are not coercive, in the sense that they lack the
element of physical violence that is closely identified with military action, and those
of Article 42. Enforcement action, with the use of physical force, is obviously the
prerogative of the Security Council, with a single exception: individual or collective
self-defense. But the other measures, those of Article 41, are not ....
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 190.
69. See M. ETzIONI, supra note 20, at 172-80 (Dominican Republic); id. at 180-90 (Cuba).
For a summary of discussions on the Cuban question in the Security Council, see Annual
Report of the Secretary-General, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 83-85, U.N. Doc. A/5201
(1962). See also HAMMARSKJOLD FORUMS, THE INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY SYSTEM AND THE
CUBAN CRISIS (1964).
70. Macdonald, The Developing Relationship between Superior and Subordinate Political
Bodies at the International Level, 1964 (II) CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 21; see M. ETZIONI, supra
note 20, at 213, 136-47; cf. Comment, Action by the Organization of American States: When
is Security Council Authorization Required UnderArticle 53 of the United Nations Charter?,
10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 837 (1963) (legality under U.N. Charter of Security Council toleration
of O.A.S. enforcement).
71. Proponents of the "amendment" -theory, including the United States, argue that the
paralyzing effect of the veto on Security Council action has created a need for alternative
peacekeeping institutions, and that regional organizations can and should fill this gap.
Halderman, Regional Enforcement Measures and the United Nations, 52 GEo. L.J. 89, 107
(1963).
72. The right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
in case of an armed attack is not affected by Article 53; therefore, prior Security Council
authorization is not required where O.A.S. action is undertaken in self-defense. Comment,
supra note 70, at 859-68.
73. The political implications of this conclusion in the context of traditional O.A.S.
enforcement measures are vastly different from those suggested by an expanded application
of the Rio Treaty which would include acts of economic aggression. In the first situation, the
small states, such as Cuba, sought the protection of the Security Council in the face of
adverse collective action spearheaded by the United States. By contrast, should the Latin
American countries press forward with a regional definition of econoniic aggression, the
United States-strongly opposed to such a definition--may find it difficult to challenge the
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IV
THE ELEMENTS OF A DEFINITION
Given the possibility of enforcing a regional definition of economic
aggression consistent with the provisions of the U.N. Charter,74 and
assuming political forces are such that a majority of O.A.S. states would
actively pursue or accept such a codification, 75 the problem becomes one
of draftsmanship. In short, how should economic aggression be defined?
A. THE ACT MUST BE ILLEGAL
Before a state's action may be characterized as aggressive, it must first
be found to be illegal under international law. This requirement is essen-
tial to safeguard the right of all states to pursue actions in accordance with
their best interests as long as those actions do not violate international
law.76 A state's economic 7 actions may be viewed as illegal if they violate
treaties, 78 general principles of international law, or the principle of
nonintervention. 79 The latter doctrine contains vague notions of undue
coercion; this vagueness may be reduced by including the elements of
purpose or intent.
Unlawful intent need not be proved in cases of armed aggression. Thus
the General Assembly's definition of aggression does not mention this
element. However, with other forms of aggression the line between
legality and illegality is not so easily drawn. Many economic measures
taken by one state are likely to have some effect, perhaps harmful, on
another state. 80 In applying the test of intent, only those measures under-
taken primarily8' for the purpose of damaging the economy of another
nation or as a means of coercing another nation should be acts of unlawful
definition's legality in light of the United States earlier narrow reading of Article 53.
Furthermore, the United States veto in the Security Council could not block O.A.S. action
short of armed force. See Lillich, Economic Coercion and the International Legal Order, 51
INT'L AFF. 358 (1975).
74. See notes 60-73 supra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 54-59 supra and accompanying text.
76. See notes 107-114 infra and accompanying text.
77. The present discussion is limited to economic acts; this limitation will later be
replaced with a less restrictive requirement. See notes 91-96 infra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
79. Bowett, supra note 28, at 2-3. One possible fourth ground is the U.N. Charter itself.
Bowett's view, however, is that Article 2(4)'s prohibition on the "use or threat of force"
does not encompass economic coercion. Bowett, supra note 26, at 245. But see Brosche,
supra note 22, at 34.
80. Bowett, supra note 28, at 5.
81. The word "primarily" rather than "solely" is used so that where a combination of
purposes is evident, the existence of some legitimate purposes, if minor in comparison with
the illegitimate purposes, will not save the measures in question from being characterized as
illegal.
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intervention. 82 One scholar rejects the requirement of illicit intent, focus-
ing instead on the consequences of states' actions, thus imposing a form
of absolute liability on interventionist states. 83 Although this view sim-
plifies the difficult problems of proof,84 its infringement on state
sovereignty is politically unacceptable. 85
B. THE ACT MUST BE AGGRESSIVE
Virtually all writers agree that the intensity or degree of harm that one
state's actions have on the economy of another state is an important
element in the definition of aggression. The injury may range, for exam-
ple, from a minor fluctuation in export prices due to a slight tariff
increase, to a major disruption of domestic industry caused by the sus-
pension of shipments of essential products. While some authors regard
intensity as a necessary element in defining illegality, 86 others view it as
an element which transforms an act of "simple illegality" into an act of
"aggravated illegality" such as economic aggression. 87 Under the latter
view, it is not enough that the act complained of be violative of interna-
tional law; it must also affect the victim country's economy to such a
degree as to endanger its collective peace and security. "Unless this
danger is perceived, the act may be unlawful, it may be interventionist or
coercive, but it is not aggression."8'
This distinction between illegality and aggression is important, since a
simple illegality gives rise only to unilateral measures of retaliation or
self-defense,8 9 whereas an act of economic aggression opens up the
possibility of sanctions by a collectivity of states.9° Of course, incorporat-
82. See A.V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, supra note 14, at 410-11; Bowett, supra note
28, at 5. Bowett notes that although the test of intent may be difficult to apply, "ltlhe only
answer may lie in the States themselves and such review organs as the Security Council, the
General Assembly, and the Councils of regional organizations which are confronted with
economic disputes." Id. at 5 n. 18 (emphasis added).
83. B. SUPERVIELLE, supra note 2, at 74.
84. See notes 97-98 infra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 107-114 infra and accompanying text.
86. E.g., Muir, supra note 26, at 203; see, e.g., Tiewul, supra note 35, at 676-77;
Schwebel, supra note 54, at 451-52.
87. See, e.g., B. SUPERVIELLE, supra note 2, at 78-81; THOMAS, supra note 8, at 17-18.
The authors combine the notions that intensity is a required element of aggression, and that
illegality is a precondition of aggression:
Aggression should not therefore be understood as every action which affects
adversely the interests of another state in a significant way. Conduct to be aggression
must seriously affect the security of a state, its existence and independence, but in
affecting that security it must be a delictual act at international law.
Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
88. B. SUPERVIELLE, supra note 2, at 78 (translation by the author).
89. See D. BowE-r, SELF DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 106-14 (1958).
90. See notes 50-59 supra and accompanying text (enforcement mechanisms of the Rio
Treaty).
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ing a definition of economic aggression into the security system of the Rio
Treaty contemplates its enforcement through collective action. The re-
quirement that an unlawful act must have a serious effect on the economy
of the victim state would limit the imposition of collective enforcement
measures to those cases in which such measures are reasonably war-
ranted.
C. THE ACT NEED NOT BE ECONOMIC
It has often been assumed that the term "economic aggression" derives
its name from the means used to apply pressure on a victim state.9 This
construction emphasizes the economic nature of the measures used to
coerce, for example, the manipulation of tariffs, the imposition of embar-
goes and boycotts, the dumping of goods, and the freezing of funds. Thus
one author has suggested that the concept of economic coercion ought to
be replaced by a code of conduct regulating trading practices. 92
Others have focused on the purpose of the measures taken rather than
the means used in achieving that purpose. According to this view, it does
not matter what means are used to coerce-be they economic or diplo-
matic measures, or even the use of armed force-so long as the purpose is
to disrupt a state's economy. 93 A blockade, for example, depends on the
use of force to prevent cargo from reaching its destination and would
constitute an act of aggression under the U.N. definition of aggression.94
But insofar as the purpose of the blockade is to deprive a state of its
economic resources, it would also constitute an act of economic aggres-
sion. 95 One consequence of this distinction is that a regional agency which
had outlawed acts of economic aggression would be able to move collec-
tively against the alleged aggressor without having to wait for Security
Council authorization. %
D. PROBLEMS OF PROOF
The requirement of illegal intent presents ticklish problems of proof.
For example, it is almost impossible to prove that a tariff is intervention-
91. For example, Tiewul broadly describes economic coercion as "an attempt to con-
strain state conduct through the use [or] withholding of economic resources." Tiewul, supra
note 35, at 670.
92. Bowett, supra note 26, at 258-59.
93. THOMAS, supra note 8, at 24; see, e.g., B. SUPERVIELLE, supra note 2, at 75-84.
94. The U.N. definition characterizes "[t]he blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by
the armed forces of another State" as an act of aggression. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 31) 142, 143, art. 3(c), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
95. While Supervielle recognizes that in practice economic measures are generally used
to achieve economic objectives, his list of illustrative examples reminds us that a threat to a
state's economy may be posed through various means. B. SUPERVIELLE, supra note 2, at 83-
87.
96. See notes 60-73 supra and accompanying text.
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ist, "for nations usually cite a long series of legitimate reasons in connec-
tion with the imposition of new duties." 97 Similar problems are raised by
the requirement of intensity-that aggressive acts must have a serious
effect on the victim state's economy. One author has contended that
these problems are compounded by the lack of a suitable international
body to evaluate claims of economic aggression.9"
While these problems of proof are considerable, they do not pose an
insurmountable barrier to a workable definition of economic aggression.
An international deliberative body such as the Organ of Consultation of
the O.A.S. may evaluate all the evidence presented to it, as well as that
uncovered on its own, in reaching its final findings of fact.99 As in any
adjudicative process the outcome will depend on the ability of the parties
to meet their respective burdens of proof. Although problems of proof
may prevent many nations from establishing their allegations of economic
aggression, from the standpoint of world order, perhaps this is not an
undesirable result. The decisions of international tribunals would contri-
bute to the development of much-needed case law in this area. There is
little justification for delaying the ongoing process of codification of
international law merely because the adoption of a particular definition-
that of economic aggression-would pose difficult questions for the trier
of fact.
E. ARRIVING AT A DEFINITION
Incorporating the various elements already discussed, it is possible to
propose the following general definition of economic aggression:
Any unilateral act by a state'0° directed against another state or group of
states which is intended to and which does in fact deprive such state or
states of essential resources or which seriously impairs its normal
economic activities, thereby threatening the state's sovereign right to
make its own political decisions, is an act of economic aggression. 01
97. A.V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, supra note 14, at 410. See also Muir, supra note 26,
at 203 (noting the difficulty of defining illegal purpose).
98. Bowett, supra note 26, at 255.
99. For example, see the evidence presented to the Organ of Consultation in connection
with Venezuela's complaint against the Dominican Republic in 1960. Rio Treaty Applica-
tions, supra note 55, at 1, 17-27 (Request of the Government of Venezuela, 1960).
100. Although actors in international law traditionally are states, where measures other-
wise violative of this definition are taken by entities other than states, such as individuals or
corporations, it is arguable that the state may nonetheless be held responsible for those
actions if those measures may reasonably be traced to the state's governmental purpose or
policy. Cf. Tiewul, supra note 35, at 670 (individuals, corporations, and international
organizations may engage in economic coercion).
101. This definition is borrowed from Supervielle, with certain modifications. SUPER-
VIELLE, supra note 2, at 82. The italicized words refer to the elements discussed in notes 76-
96 supra and accompanying text. The last phrase, dealing with sovereignty, is consistent
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This general definition should be complemented by a list of illustrative
examples. 0 2 Such a list would provide that it is not exhaustive so that the
deliberative body may add to the list as case law develops. This defini-
tional structure-combining a general definition with an enumerative
list-was adopted by the Special Committee of the U.N. which defined
aggression.103
Reference should be made to possible justifications for acts which
might otherwise constitute economic aggression. 1°4 Where measures are
undertaken pursuant to the authorization of a competent international
organ, such measures naturally fall outside the ambit of the definition.
The issue here is one of competence; while the power of the Security
Council and of designated organs under certain treaty arrangements to
authorize sanctions is well established, similar assertions of competence
by regional or nonregional associations of states have been challenged. 105
Principles of self-defense and reprisal may also justify otherwise un-
lawful action. Traditionally, the state seeking to justify its conduct on
these grounds must show: that the action was elicited by a wrong on the
part of the state against which such conduct is directed; that there were
no other available means of redress; and that the measures taken in
retaliation or in self-defense were necessary and proportional to the
eliciting act."' 6
V
WORLD ORDER CONSIDERATIONS
A. ECONoMIc AGGRESSION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Every treaty, resolution, or convention contributes to the ongoing
erosion of the concept of state sovereignty. The system of independent
and equal nation states which forms the basis of the concept of sovereign-
with recent General Assembly resolutions, see notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text, as
well as with Article 19 of the O.A.S. Charter, see text at note 48 supra.
102. The elaboration of such a list is beyond the scope of this Note. Supervielle offers his
own list, B. SUPERVIELLE, supra note 2, at 83-84, which seems, to this author, to be overly
general. For example, Supervielle includes as a form of economic aggression "measures of
whatever nature intended to pressure international markets, directed against the economy of
another state, or creating artificial fluctuations in prices of primary goods or manufactured
products, with grave consequences for the state affected." Id. at 84 (translation by the
author).
103. Article 3 of the U.N. definition enumerates specific acts of aggression. G.A. Res.
3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, 143, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). For a
discussion of the different forms of definitions, see Schwebel, supra note 54, at 434-45.
104. No attempt will be made here to deal fully with the broad concept of justification in
international law. See generally D. BowETr, supra note 89; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at
214-349.
105. Bowett, supra note 26, at 252-54. See notes 60-73 supra and accompanying text.
106. Bowett, supra note 26, at 249-52.
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ty may be traced back to 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia ended the.
Thirty Years War.107 Although the idea had surfaced before, it was not
until the 20th century that states began voluntarily to renounce their
absolute right to wage war,t0 8 thus striking the first serious blow against
the notion of sovereignty. But old concepts die hard, and whenever states
meet to sign a treaty, adopt a resolution, or attend a convention, great
consideration is apt to be given to state sovereignty.
Under traditional international law, one of the attributes of sovereignty
is the right of states to conduct foreign economic policy according to their
best interests." 9 In trade as in war, the absolute exercise of this right has
partially given way to multilateral treaties'10 and General Assembly reso-
lutions"' protecting states from unjustified discriminatory treatment in
the world market. This relinquishment of rights has been cautious, how-
ever, since the same documents which limit states' freedom to act as they
please in foreign trade also proclaim the inviolability of state sovereignty
in matters of economic policy." 2 It seems that those states which support
a definition of economic aggression are largely the same states which
vociferously defend the notion of state sovereignty. This position, while
apparently inconsistent, may be understood if viewed from the perspec-
tive of smaller and weaker states seeking to protect themselves against
the dominating influence of the world powers. Moreover, the economical-
ly powerful countries are not likely to tolerate significant limitations on
their right to pursue foreign economic policy according to internal inter-
ests. " Therefore, in defining economic aggression, the attributes of state
sovereignty must not be significantly impaired.
The definitional elements discussed in the previous section ensure that
the freedom of states to pursue lawful economic policies will not be
compromised. Indeed, by requiring a pervasive harmful effect before an
unlawful measure may be classified as aggressive, 14 the definition pro-
vides more leeway to nations than does general international law. It is not
107. Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 21, 26 (1948).
108. Coplin, International Law and Assumptions about the State System, 17 WORLD POL.
615, 629-30 (1965); see 1 B. FERENCZ, supra note 2, at 5-25.
109. Muir, supra note 26, at 188-92.
110. E.g., GATT, supra note 27.
Ill. E.g., G.A. Res. 3281,29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
112. Compare id. arts. 10, 14 with id. arts. 1, 2. One author has commented: "It will be
noted that Paragraph I [of G.A. Res. 3281], dealing with 'full permanent sovereignty' now
covers not only all of a State's 'natural resources' and all of its 'wealth' but also all of its
'economic activities.'" Haight, The New International Economic Order and the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, 9 INrr'L LAW. 591, 598 (1975). See also G.A. Res.
3171, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
113. Muir rightly points out that the United States has asserted this incidental right of
state sovereignty through various laws authorizing the regulation of trade practices in
accordance with national security interests. Muir, supra note 26, at 192-94.
114. See notes 86-90 supra and accompanying text.
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the purpose of such a codification to become a catch-all provision direct-
ed against the slightest transgression of international law. Rather, it is to
provide an international forum where allegations of economic aggression
may be heard by competent organs guided by a specific and accepted
legal definition. To oppose such a codification for fear of losing certain
incidents of national sovereignty is to ignore the changes that have taken
place in international law since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.
B. THREAT TO WORLD PEACE?
It has frequently been argued in the U.N. that extending the definition
of aggression to include economic and other forms of indirect aggression
would threaten world peace by increasing the number of incidents
purportedly giving rise to the right of self-defense. 1 5 Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter provides that only an armed attack triggers the inherent
right of self-defense." 6 Yet this limited application of Article 51 is not
universally recognized. 117
In view of this difference of opinion over the scope of Article 51, the
fear that defining economic aggression may promote the use of armed
force may well be justified. The Rio Treaty in Article 10 expressly
protects member states' rights and obligations under the U.N. Charter,
and Article 7 specifically states that peacekeeping measures under the
115. For example, Mexico's representative to the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General
Assembly argued that if acts not involving the use of force were included in the definition of
aggression, there would be an increased possibility of a state's resort to armed force in the
exercise of its right of self-defense. 23 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1075th mtg.) 4, para. 27, U.N.
Doc. AIC.6/SR. 1075 (1968).
116. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations .... " In the U.N. General Assembly Sixth Committee
debates on the U.N. definition of aggression, Mr. Alcivar of Ecuador urged that a state
could exercise its right of self-defense to repel not any form of aggression but solely armed
attack. 23 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1078th mtg.) 6, para. 36, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1078 (1968).
117. Bowett's view is that:
[S]ince no absolute distinction between economic and military delicts seems justifi-
able or accepted, it must follow that the right to use force in self-defense against an
economic delict cannot be excluded. Obviously, the economic delict would have to
be of such a kind as to pose a threat to the security of a State, and the requirement of
proportionality would involve the necessity of proving that there was no other
effective means of protection.
Bowett, supra note 26, at 251 n.21. Peru's representative at the U.N. similarly insisted that
self-defense was justified against all acts of aggression, not merely against armed attack. 12
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 15, para. 121, U.N. Doc. A/3574 (1957).
Brownlie, on the other hand, opposes resort to force by states which have been the
victims of economic pressure, even where the protective force is proportional to the
economic pressure exerted against them, and where the threat is of such a serious character
as to endanger the political independence or territorial integrity of the victim country. I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 434-35.
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Treaty shall be applied "without prejudice to the right of self-defense in
conformity with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations."
118
Nevertheless, there is no reason why in adopting a definition of economic
aggression the O.A.S. could not in the same document expressly pro-
scribe the use of armed force in self-defense against an alleged economic
aggressor. Certainly such a definition could not expand states' rights
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Moreover, contracting parties that
bind themselves under an international agreement ought not complain
that their rights are being abridged. Far from posing a threat to world
peace, defining economic aggression should discourage resort to armed
force by providing a further mechanism for the settlement of disputes and
by clarifying the impropriety of resorting to armed force in response to
economic coercion.
C. VALUE OF A DEFINITION
Despite the great efforts that were made to arrive at a consensus
definition of aggression in the U.N., there is much skepticism as to its
legal and practical effect. This skepticism stems from the fact that the
definition leaves full discretion in the Security Council to determine in
each case, in light of the facts and surrounding circumstances, whether
there has been an act of aggression." 9 Indeed, the intention of the Special
Committee members was never otherwise.
120
The same criticism may of course be directed against adopting a defini-
tion of economic aggression within the security system of the O.A.S. The
Organ of Consultation, as the deliberative body under the Rio Treaty,1
2
'
would necessarily exercise great discretion in determining whether a state
is guilty of economic aggression. It does not seem likely, however, that
the Organ of Consultation would routinely ignore the specific guidelines
of a definition. At the very least, the Organ of Consultation would feel
compelled to explain its decisions in light of the definitional guidelines,
particularly where the definition formed the basis of the complaint lead-
ing to the convocation of the Organ of Consultation.
More troublesome is the question whether a definition of economic
aggression will reduce interventionist action. In the setting of the O.A.S.,
as in a larger world context, this question is complicated by the uneven
political and economic strength among states. As one commentator has
pointed out: "Regional forums . . . do not guarantee the effective and
118. Rio Treaty, supra note 43, art. 7.
119. See Schwebel, supra note 54, at 426-28, 448.
120. See Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 29
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19) 8, 12, U.N. Doec. A/9619 (1974).
121. Rio Treaty, supra note 43, art. 6.
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equal participation of all members in the organization's activities. Indeed,
more often than not, one power clearly dominates the actions of all the
others."' 2 2 It is not surprising, therefore, that much of Latin America
perceives United States economic aid policy as the major foreign influ-
ence in the region. That this influence is often unlawful is doubted by
few. That it has in some cases resulted in violence and the overthrow of
legally instituted governments is at least arguable. 23 In attempting to
protect themselves from interventionist measures by a world power, the
smaller and weaker states may need to choose between the more militant
path of adopting a definition of economic aggression and the more con-
ciliatory path of seeking informal understandings and diplomatic conces-
sions. Even assuming the existence of a definition supported by an
enforcement mechanism such as that of the Rio Treaty, the definition's
effectiveness in protecting smaller and weaker states against the alleged
economic aggression of a powerful state must be suspect. Therefore the
wiser course may be that of conciliation rather than confrontation.
But economic agression may also occur at the regional level between
more evenly matched states. In this context, the weight of collective ac-
tion may serve to quickly end the dispute. The questionable effectiveness
of a definition of economic aggression may rightfully influence the polit-
ical choice of whether to actively pursue such a codification. But given a
general perceived need for such a definition, its questionable effective-
ness should not be an obstacle to its adoption. As with the definition of
aggression, there would be considerable value in the mere fact of codifi-
cation.124 There is a danger in evaluating the need for a specific code of
international law on the basis of its probable effectiveness-to do so is to
place in doubt the value of much of our present international legal system.
CONCLUSION
Economic coercion has been condemned in numerous international
legal documents; yet the concept remains vague and undefined. The
American states have traditionally given a broad construction to the
concept of aggression, and as a group they have provided much of the
122. M. ETZIONI, supra note 20, at 211.
123. See Brosche, supra note 22, at 11-15; Francis, La ayuda econdmica de Estados
Unidos a Amirica Latina como instrumento de control politico, 12 FORO INTERNACIONAL
433 (1972); Scott, Economic Aid and Imperialism in Bolivia, MONTHLY REV., May 1972, at
48.
124. The importance of the 1974 consensus definition of aggression--quite apart from
any impact it may have on reducing resort to armed force by states-lies largely in the mere
fact of codification, that is, the development of a specific legal definition of a long recog-
nized and admittedly important principle of international law. Ferencz, The United Nations
Consensus Definition of Aggression: Sieve or Substance?, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 701, 716-
17 (1975).
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impetus for addressing the issue of economic aggression at the U.N. The
O.A.S. thus presents an ideal testing ground for developing a definition of
economic aggression in international law. Given the necessary political
attitudes, the Rio Treaty's sophisticated system of security may easily be
adapted to include such a definition. The definition may be enforced
through nonmilitary sanctions consistent with the limitations imposed by
the U.N. Charter. The adoption of a definition would not pose a threat to
world peace or to the concept of state sovereignty. Rather, it would
further the process of codification, clarify the concept of economic
aggression, provide an additional forum for the settlement of disputes,
and reduce the resort to force.
Martin Domb

